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Abstract
The African continent is the last place to consider seeking case studies for political and
economic success. In the midst of this gloomy picture, Botswana and Mauritius have
emerged as two of the most stable democracies with the most politically and
economically advanced economies in the world. In conducting a careful and critical
analysis of the reasons for their success, there is often the temptation of labeling the
achievements of these two nations as political and economic “miracles”. This study seeks
not to single out these two countries as unique cases, but as models of growth for the rest
of the African continent, from which, other countries in the African sub-region can learn
in order to build upon the modest gains made by these two countries and subsequently
fuel their own political and economic development. The examples of Botswana and
Mauritius reveal that with workable political institutions and pragmatic economic
policies, a country is bound to succeed irrespective of its location and geographical
inclinations and predictions. Institutions, political or economic, ought not necessarily to
be democratic, but ones oriented and suited to meet African political and economic
conditions. There is a realization that pragmatic political institutions and workable
economic policies are essential to Africa’s overall political and economic development.
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Chapter I
Introduction
The African continent is not a particularly interesting case study in terms of political and
economic analysis. At most, it is the least recognized of cases when considering instances
of political and economic success for academic research or independent analysis in areas
of political stability and sustained economic growth. The continent is most famous for its
long history of political unrest and economic mismanagement. In short, the African
continent is a hotbed as far as discussions on politics and economic development are
concerned. The situation is so volatile that Acemoglu et al (2001) assess that there is a
universal pessimistic consensus in terms of Africa’s political and economic growth (p.
80). The situation is attributed to what Acemoglu et al (2001) perceive as little or no
investment and high inequality during the colonial period (p.1). There is no doubt that the
African continent is endowed with abundant natural resources. However, centuries of
colonial rule left the African continent impoverished. Even after independence was
finally attained, most African nations struggled with high levels of poverty and
underdevelopment, and were seldom heard of by the rest of the world (Hillbom 2008:
p.1). Thus, the African continent presents fewer opportunities as far as analysis of
political stability and economic advancement. It remains a dark horse in assessing
developmental issues, and for this reason, very few people dare look at the continent in
assessing issues regarding political stability and economic development.
In spite of the gloomy picture, Botswana and Mauritius present African cases of sustained
political and economic growth in sharp contrast with the largely pessimistic view of the
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African continent vis-à-vis political and economic development. In this paper, I discuss
the political overviews and economic developments of Botswana and Mauritius, and
challenges in the political and economic spheres. I envisage areas of comparative
analysis, and the way forward as far as building effective and pragmatic institutions for
the rest of the African continent using Botswana and Mauritius as exemplary models. The
understanding is that these two countries present cases of pragmatic and accountable
economies managed by effective leadership and test cases for the rest of the world and
not only the African sub-region. In a continent notorious for setting bad political
precedence and economic mismanagement, Botswana and Mauritius present unique
experiences from which the rest of the world can learn. This is not to say that it is all
smooth sailing. To say that these two countries have not experienced any of the hardships
experienced by other developing nations in the world would be an understatement and for
this reason, this paper also explores the shortfalls as far as the two countries are
concerned. This paper is not necessarily to “glorify” these two nations but envisage ways
to build upon gains so far made. It is even more imperative to say that the African subregion is not a particularly interesting case when considering instances of political and
economic success stories. With a long history of colonial rule and economic
mismanagement, Africa is most often noted for its notorious civil wars, poverty, and
feeble political, and economic institutional setup. Notwithstanding, Botswana and
Mauritius lead in global political and economic assessment, and projection. While the
sustained growth levels of these two countries come off as a surprise to many, with
several commentaries attributing the growth to a “miracle”, they present unique cases and
justify a rethinking of how Africa, in general, is perceived in world political and
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economic circles. Botswana and Mauritius’ political and economic growth levels point
to a region making giant strides in political and economic circles to the neglect of the
most advanced global institutional setups.
Africa as a continent is gradually emerging from its dark past and Botswana and
Mauritius lead the way as models of a continent that is gradually becoming a political and
economic powerhouse. In achieving this feat, Botswana and Mauritius ought not to be
portrayed as heroes, but instead as a step in the direction of eventual development of the
African continent. The achievements of these two countries present a path which other
African countries can follow and be equally successful politically and economically. The
argument here is simple; Africa as a continent has the wherewithal to strive and succeed
like any other place on the global political and economic stage. After all, the continent is
endowed with abundant resources and with proper and pragmatic political and economic
measures, it is only time that Africa starts to compete with the established global political
and economic powers on the same footing. A continent possessing the magnitude of
natural wealth, it is often unsettling that Africa is largely absent in the enclaves of
economic power brokers and instead is projected in the circles of economic
impoverishment and political instability.
This notwithstanding, Africa is gradually emerging as the new economic powerhouse.
Available indicators, especially those of Botswana and Mauritius, and others project a
continent gradually making gains in the economic sector. As political leadership is often
considered the cause of Africa’s economic woes, political leadership is also showing
promise of allowing democratic institutions to function rather than political leadership
rooted in “praetorianism” and “clientelism”, for which Africa was largely known. The
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amazing thing is that these developments (political and economic) are occurring on the
blind side to the rest of the world and more so to the astonishment of political and
economic analysts, thereby leading others to conclude that these developments are more
“miraculous” than credible. In this paper, careful emphasis is laid on the fact that these
development gains are results of years of careful policy planning and initiatives that, at
best, work well within the African terrain. The point is that Botswana and Mauritius’
political and economic developments are by no means miracles, but commitments to
change the old ways of doing things, and others on the continent are capable of achieving
similar feats.
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Chapter II
Literature Review
Political Assessment of Botswana
Botswana is a landlocked country with a population of nearly 2.1 million people (CIA,
February 2014). It borders four Southern African states namely Zimbabwe, South Africa,
Namibia and Zambia (Parson 1984: p.4). Parson (1984) assesses that a greater part of
Botswana’s land is “uninhabitable”, with the Kalahari Desert accounting for roughly 84
percent of Botswana’s landmass (p.4). The CIA (2014) assesses in this regard that little of
the land, roughly 0.66%, is used for crop production (web). “Consequently, 80 percent of
the population lives along the fertile eastern border of the country” (Parson 1984: p.4).
Like most African nations, Botswana is an ethnically diverse country. The US Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) presents the population distribution of Botswana as follows:
Tswana 79%, Kalanga 11%, Basarwa 3% and other, including Kgalagadi and white
accounting for 7% of the total population (February, 2014). However, unlike other
African examples where ethnicity has been largely responsible for civil and political
unrest, diversity in Botswana paints an entirely different picture. Robinson (2009)
assesses the issue in the Botswana Comparative National Systems (BCNS) saying that,
“it is the organization of the Tswana states which mostly accounts for the relatively
homogenous nature of society” (p.2). This homogeneity has helped unify Botswana and
allowed it to make efficient decisions. This position is echoed by Parsons (1985), who
assesses that the most remarkable thing about Botswana is how much legitimacy of
Tswana-dom, has been supported and accepted by non-Tswana groups (p. 28). This
example demonstrates the level of ethnic tolerance that exists within the country,
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something that is largely absent in other parts of Africa, and which has culminated in
effectively developing the nation.
Botswana gained its independence in 1966. Like most countries in Africa, the country
was a British colony. Cook and Sarkin (2010) reflect that the country was the
Protectorate of Bechuanaland from 1885 to 1966. The British established the protectorate
at the request of two chiefs, Khama and Setshele, who sought protection from the threat
of other indigenous groups, mainly the Boers, present in the area (p.460). As a
protectorate, Cook and Sarkin (2010) argue that Botswana suffered less colonial intrusion
and repression than most of its neighboring countries, under similar European control (p.
460). The slightest understanding is that, since the territory willfully requested formal
British control and administration, by way of protection from other indigenous threats,
this made it easier for the British to govern the territory with tested democratic
institutions right from the onset. For example, the pre-colonial setup emphasized
continuity and the colonial system did not oppose these established traditional
institutions, but instead combined or co-operated with these recognized systems (Good
1992:p.71). This relationship between the British and native Bechuanaland administration
led to putting in place modern democratic institutions in effectively administering the
territory, something other African countries had to attain independence before achieving.
This gives Botswana an added advantage by way of comparison with other African states
that witnessed colonial rule. To this end, Fearon and Laitin (web 2014) argue that there
was hardly a new state in Botswana in 1965, [independence that is] but a state with a
secure ally as its head, who was thoroughly dependent on Britain for its own prosperity,
or even survival (p.6). For example, the British paid the entire recurrent budget of the
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nation, and it was not until 1971, with the production of diamonds, that Britain no longer
paid the full cost of administration (Fearon and Laitin web: p.6). The relationship
between the British and natives meant that transfer of power to the new administration
witnessed a smooth transition, something inimical to other African states between the
colonial power and natives. Again, the example of Kenneth Good (1992) on the
continuity and co-operation between the Tswana and the colonial administration (p.71)
comes into play here. This example was largely absent in other parts of Africa, where
colonial rule and subsequent the transition to independence was characterized by
nationalist sentiments culminating in bloody civil wars and loss of lives. In the case of
Botswana, Fearon and Laitin (web) note that nationalism was mild, and did not induce
popular mobilization for rapid independence. Instead, the transition to independence was
pushed more by colonial authorities, than by nationalist leaders (p.1). For example, Good
(1992) notes that the colonial administration and the incoming leadership joined in an
informal coalition to plan out and shape Botswana’s post-independence politics and
further development (pp.72-73).
Politically, Botswana provides a model for others to follow. As noted, Botswana takes its
political development and positioning from the colonial era. From all indications,
Botswana presents a unique case of a remodeling or rebranding of the traditional African
chieftaincy system, run by functional modern democratic institutions. It is a case of a
homegrown, stable and sustained democracy (Zibani Maundeni 2005: p.80). Unlike other
African examples where colonialism eroded the chieftaincy system and relegated the
influence of such monarchies to the background, Botswana serves as the opposite. In this
case. Good (1992) notes that in Botswana, chiefs were the source of political and
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economic power (p. 69) in the pre and post-colonial times. This served as the foundation
upon which political power was distributed. Good (1992) assesses that this became the
forum within which political consensus was generated in post-independence Botswana,
as independence did not necessarily imply reciprocity between the rich and poor (p.70).
In short, colonialism retained the inherited institutional structure of the state (Good 1992:
p. 70-1). The key element here is the commitment to ensure continuity of these existing
political structures in the post-colonial era by Botswana. This amounted to political
participation of dominant political actors, for example, the Tswana, in establishing a
workable political setup in the post-colonial era. Beaulier (2004) notes, for example, that
the British did not destroy chiefdoms in Botswana, but instead maintained and
strengthened these political institutions (p.231-232). Thus, the existing traditional
systems informed the setting up of formal political structures in the independence period.
In the post-colonial times, Botswana has continued to practice Western-style democracy.
It is a parliamentary republic with a sound political structure based on Roman-Dutch law
and local customary law (Cook and Sarkin 2010: p.641). Beaulier (2004) notes that
Botswana’s democratic system is a Westminster Parliamentary model. The government is
unicameral, with a thirty-one member Assembly responsible for law making. There is
also a Council of Chiefs, which is separate from the Assembly, and whose main role is to
serve as an advisory body to the executive (Parson1984: 39). Parson (1984) notes
Parliament’s role as one responsible for making laws for the peace, order, and good
governance of Botswana (p. 39). In line with the Westminster model, Botswana’s
executive is responsible to the legislature. The president has the power to withhold the
signing of bills and in this case return them to the Assembly for further deliberation,
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passage, and president’s subsequent assent. The president also serves in the capacity of
the commander in chief of the army and appoints all ministers (Parson 1984: 39-40).
In addition, Botswana also inherited a British common law legal framework in which the
criminal courts have adopted a precedent-based legal code (Beaulier 2004: p.231). Even
more important, Botswana has incorporated tried and tested traditional African customary
practices into its legal structure by basing civil laws on customs and traditional systems
(Beaulier 2004: p.231).
Again, there is visible evidence of the continuation of traditional customary systems
intertwined with modern Western democratic systems to ensure a stable political system.
The understanding is that, the natives easily identified with and easily adapted to the
Western-style political systems.
Since independence in 1966, Botswana has held successive national elections to elect top
government leaders (Botswana Comparative National Systems 2009:p.2). This has
ensured stable governance and popular acclamation for leaders elected to public offices,
even though the Botswana Democratic Party has controlled both the presidency and the
National Assembly since 1965 (Beaulier 2004: p.230). The political system is supported
by a very vibrant bureaucratic setup. Fibaek (2010) notes that the first President of
Botswana, Seretse Khama, a former chief, established an accountable civil service, aimed
at a development-oriented government (p.5). For example, Good (1992) argues that the
civil service maintained high professional standards and kept a well-defined line of
authority and accountability (p.74). Acemoglu et al (2001) note, for example, that
Botswana’s bureaucracy, on the whole, is meritocratic and non-corrupt (p.20). To further
enhance its importance to the government, political elites constantly sought expert
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opinion from senior bureaucrats in their line of work (Good 1992:p. 74). The
bureaucracy thus to a larger extent influenced economic policy (Taylor 2002: p. 4). These
facts attest to the strategic role played by the bureaucracy in ensuring professional
standards in civil service and successes of the government in power. This is not to imply
that these leaders became dictators as was evident in several African territories in the
post-independence era. Zubani (2005) claims that instances of succession in Botswana
involved the principles of traditional and legal rational authority (p.81). Thus, the
traditional Tswana states developed clear principles of succession. In sum, Botswana’s
political experience is one characterized by coordination and mutuality, all aimed at
building one vibrant political system with deep-seated traditional inclination.
Economic Development of Botswana
Economically, Botswana started on a slow footing. As a matter of fact, it has not always
been a success story. For example, the Botswana Comparative National Systems (2009)
notes that Botswana was one of the least developed countries in the world at the time of
independence, in terms of per capita income (p.3). In a terrain described as arid and
landlocked (Michael Lewin 2011:p.81), Botswana has emerged from its initially
impoverished status to become one of the economic giants of the African continent and
the world for that matter. From an economy initially based on commercial agriculture and
domestic capital accumulation through export production in cattle (Good 1992: p. 73),
Botswana’s economy has metamorphosed into the fastest growing economies in the
world with an average growth rate of 9% per year from 1967 to 2006 (US Department of
State, 2009). Between 1965 and 1995, Botswana’s economy grew at a rate of 7.7% per
annum (Beaulier 2004: p.231), according the country a middle income status with a per
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capita GDP of $7,343 in 2008 (US Department of State, 2009). The growth was so rapid
that by the year 2001, Beaulier (2004) assesses that Botswana’s per capita gross domestic
product of $7,820, was twice the average per capita income of the Asian tigers ($3,854),
and four times the average per capita income of $1,826 of the sub-Saharan African region
(p.321).
Botswana’s economic turnaround is so remarkable that it has been termed the “African
miracle” (Cook and Sarkin 2010: p.462). Good (1992) provides a quick overview of the
economic situation by noting that domestic savings of GDP, which was negative at the
time of independence, averaged over 20 per cent of total GDP by 1970. Again,
Botswana’s foreign reserves stood at $3,300 million by 1990 and continued to rise,
providing import cover of approximately 16 months (p. 74). Good (1992) provides the
reasons for the growth by noting that, “while Botswana's rapid growth depended 'to a
considerable degree' on foreign capital, the economy was an open one, with a firm and
stable currency referred to by The Economist as the Swiss franc of Africa” (ibid). The
reason for this success was Botswana’s high commitment to “regulatory quality” and
curbing corruption in the economy (Hillbom 2008: p.192). As of 2002, Botswana’s
reserves stood at 41.2 billion pula, accounting for 39 months’ cover on imported goods
and services (Republic of Botswana, 2002a: p.9). Thus, the country’s commitment to fair
economic practices and a stable currency contributed to economic growth in the
Botswana example.
However, several equally important factors account for Botswana’s “miraculous”
economic turnaround, as some analysts prefer to call it. I now turn my attention to these
factors. Botswana’s economic successes, to a large extent, have been attributed to the
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country’s shift from an agriculture-dependent economy to a mineral resource-oriented
economy. Botswana’s limited arable land (estimated at 0.65 percent of its territory by
Cook and Sarkin 2010: p.462) meant fewer opportunities for economic growth in terms
of the agriculture industry in the pre-colonial and colonial era, which ironically centered
on cattle production.
Botswana’s pre-colonial and colonial era economy, as noted, was agriculture-based, and
this, by far, was characterized by cattle keeping. Good (1992) notes that cattle keeping
was, of course, the activity that involved the most Batswana and which affected the
agriculture industry (p.77). As evident in most agriculture-based economies in Africa
during the pre-colonial and colonial times, this sort of economic orientation existed on a
subsistence basis, and, for that matter, was unsustainable. In the Botswana example,
Good (1992) assesses that this sort of economy was not sustainable due to the fact that
although cattle were individually owned, they were often given out in battle, as gifts or as
royalties to the local chief (p.71). Thus, an economy, which existed on tribute collection
and cattle production, was bound to fail at the very least. For this reason, the discovery of
diamonds in Botswana at the time of independence could not have occurred at a more
opportune period. African economies at the time of independence especially needed a
shift from agriculture-focused economies to resource-based ones if they were to make
any impact in the global marketplace, and our discussions here will prove that, while the
discovery of such mineral deposits in other parts of the continent like Liberia and Sierra
Leone culminated in a resource curse and decades of endless civil conflict, Botswana
used its newly found natural resource wealth to diversify the economy, transform
agricultural production, and become a modern society. In Botswana’s case, the discovery
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of diamonds became such an important commodity for lifting the entire economic
fortunes of the country that without diamonds, it would be hard to imagine the consistent
economic growth achieved over the years, especially the modern structured global
economy (Hillbom 2008: p.201). This strategy is the resource for analyzing Botswana’s
miraculous economic growth and global positioning, so that it is difficult to make a
comparative analysis without stating “it is most unlikely that, the Botswana growth
miracle could have occurred unless diamonds had been found at independence” (Hillbom
2008: p.201). For that matter, it would have remained one of the poorest economies in
Africa (Cook and Sarkin 2010: p.471). Currently, Hillbom (2008) notes that “diamonds
account for roughly 30% of GDP, 70% of export revenues and 50% of government
revenue” (p.202).
Recounting the history of the discovery of diamonds in Botswana, Cook and Sarkin
(2010) note, “in 1967, geologists from the mining company De Beers discovered a
kimberlite pipe slightly northeast of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve in Orapa, near
the Makgadikgadi Pans. De Beers’ discovery of these diamond resources provided
Botswana, an immense windfall” (p.462). This discovery kick started and continues to
fuel Botswana’s economic success story to a large extent. Unlike other African examples
where governments would have nationalized private entities, the Botswana government
instead created Debswana, the national diamond company, to own equal partnership with
De Beers (Cook and Sarkin 2010: p.462).
By 1975, Botswana negotiated with De Beers Diamond Company for a 50-50-percentage
share of state control in all of Botswana’s diamond fields, in sharp contrast to an initial
85-15 percent (Taylor 2002: p.4).This meant equitable shareholding rights as far as
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government’s influence over the diamond mines was concerned, and the need to ensure
effective supervision over the diamond industry.
By the early 1980s, diamonds had overtaken cattle exports as Botswana’s leading foreign
exchange earner, as the resource accounted for 40 percent of total exports (Taylor 2002:
p.3). Receipts from the commodity also allowed Botswana to pay off its foreign debts
(Taylor 2002: p.16). This was particularly a wise decision, as African countries of similar
standing owed huge foreign debts. This freed the country from the harsh realities of
foreign debt payments and focused capital from the diamond exports on other sectors of
the economy. Even more critical, Taylor (2002) assesses that the cost of production of
diamonds in Botswana was cheaper compared to the price of diamonds on the foreign
market, and this meant that Botswana profited immensely from this (p.3). To break from
the norm where extracted raw natural resources from the African continent are sent to
Europe before they can be refined, the Botswana government established two diamondcutting factories to ensure that extracted raw materials could be refined right at home
before they were sold on the foreign market. This move led to an all-round capacity in the
production of diamonds and gave the country the power to influence the price and
volumes of diamonds produced and sold in the foreign market, especially in relation to
price fluctuations (Good 1992: p.90). This is something most African economies lacked
and continue to lack until today. The fact that these countries did not have the capacity to
refine their natural resources has meant that the price of a commodity is halved by the
time it goes through refinery and production in the foreign market, and this was
something Botswana keenly avoided.
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Overall, the diamond industry fuelled rapid growth and employment opportunities in
areas such as construction and retail, and helped transform related industries (Mandeni
and Mookodi 2004: p.4).
However, the misperception often created is that the discovery of diamonds alone was the
very reason why Botswana is in a position it is today. This was not the case. If this were
the case, the African continent would be the beacon in terms of economic success stories.
The African continent boasts of large natural mineral deposits and, for that matter, it is
impractical to single out Botswana as a unique case. This notwithstanding, Botswana
stands tall because the country seems to have effectively weathered the resource curse
which normally accompanies such finds on the continent and managed to find ways to
streamline the resource in other sectors in a region known for its bitter conflicts stemming
from such discoveries. Thus, the abundance of natural resources such as diamonds does
not necessarily guarantee the economic success of a nation unless there is that
commitment to utilize the proceeds from the resource in pragmatic projects. In short, the
discovery of diamonds in Botswana did not guarantee Botswana’s developmental success
in totality. Lewin (2011) assesses that considerable disagreement exists about whether the
discovery of minerals in a developing economy brings good or bad luck. Indeed, several
other examples in Africa have wasted huge amounts of their natural resource wealth
(p.82). In short, the presence of a natural resource is not enough ground to safeguard or
guarantee a country’s economic success. The question, therefore, is how Botswana has
managed to avoid the resource curse which has engulfed so many other African nations
of similar standing such as Angola, DR Congo, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria, to mention a
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few. In hindsight, Botswana’s success with the resource curse is good governance and
sound economic management, but this goes beyond just these two.
Botswana’s case demonstrates effective governance combined with workable economic
policies. Taylor (2002) notes that the Botswana government invested considerable sums
of the monies accrued from the diamond sale in a variety of developmental schemes
beginning with the Accelerated Rural Development Program (ARDP) in 1974. The
government committed revenues from this program to building new roads, clinics,
schools, and water systems (p.4). This was a broader-based development project aimed at
Botswana’s economic positioning in the long-term.
In 1969, the government also negotiated the SACU pact, an agreement forming the
Southern African Customs Union. This pact gave Botswana a larger portion of revenues
accruing from the sale of resources. This particular pact enabled Botswana to end its
reliance on Britain for “grants-in-aid” in early 1972/73 (Taylor 2002: p.4). This economic
decision was a carefully considered plan, and it ensured that the country benefited from a
larger pool of resource revenues. In other parts of Africa, evidence abounds of countries
with large deposits of natural resources still wallowing in abject poverty. Botswana
wanted to avoid this fate at the very least. For example, Cook and Sarkin (2010) note that
in 2006, the Botswana government and DeBeers mining company signed a deal which
created the Botswana Diamond Trading Company with the hope that Botswana’s
diamond income would remain secured for decades as well as the local labor force
(p.486).
Botswana is also on record to have invested revenues from the diamond sector.
Acemoglu et al (2001) note the negotiations between the government and De Beers to
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have yielded a socially efficient way of investing the rents. These negotiations by and
large have eased any attempts by local actors to fight for the control of the resource rents
(p.20). The understanding is that, local folks see these investments translated into
tangible projects by way of equitable distribution of national development projects.
Zubani (2005) notes the results of the national development projects in increased access
to education, job creation and opportunities, urbanization, and social advancements by
way of citizen empowerment programs (p.104).
To be cautious, diamonds are not the only fuel of Botswana’s fledgling economy. Other
equally vital economic practices account for Botswana’s economic success story. As
noted, before the discovery of diamonds in Botswana, cattle production was the backbone
of the Botswanan economy. This culminated in the country being one of the major beef
exporters in the world. With the first government-supervised abattoir opened in 1954, it
was the first known industry, and beef was exported outside the region for the first time
around this period, serving as a major foreign exchange earner (Acemoglu et al 2001:
p.17). Even in the colonial period, the colonial administration recognized beef exports as
the sole competitive economic opportunity in Bechuanaland (Hillbom 2008: p.198).
Thus, the beef industry long established its strategic importance in the Botswana
economy before the discovery of diamonds. The beef industry is so vital that, by the early
1970’s, cattle owners held strategic positions in the government. Morrison (1993) notes
that the speaker of the assembly and the minister of commerce and industry were notable
examples of cattle owners holding such strategic positions in government (p. 41). In this
respect, even in the face of the discovery of diamonds, government recognized the
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strategic importance of the cattle and beef industry to Botswana’s economic
development.
The beef exports were also the mainstay of Botswana’s national economy. Lewin (2011)
recounts that from independence until diamonds were discovered, Botswana’s beef
industry, the country’s main export and largest sector, contributed 39 percent of total
GDP (p.81). In short, this was a country dependent on beef exports in terms of foreign
exchange well before its glory days in the mineral resource sector. Therefore, government
became mindful of paying little attention or of relegating the beef industry to the
background even in the era of the diamond boom. For example, Shemi1 and Procter
(2013) note that the beef and diamond industries have contributed between 30 and 35%
of GDP within the last ten years (p. 18). This is a sharp contrast to other African
countries where the discovery of large natural resource deposits has led to the virtual
neglect of other equally important economic sectors.
Botswana’s beef exports are also noted for their quality, and the European Economic
Community (EEC) prefers them. Good (1992) notes that the country’s beef is of such
high quality that the European Community’s Common Agricultural Policy recognizes it,
thereby granting it access to the European market on a competitive pricing basis (p.75).
Lastly, in a continent notorious for economic mismanagement and miscalculation,
Botswana simply has avoided these mistakes. The country is noted for its strong
economic policy. Government is particularly committed that economic projects embody
local content and conform to the economic strategies of the country. For example, Good
(1992) assesses that economic projects are screened and foreign entities are required to
contain their programs within the governmental priorities and framework (p.76). The
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same cannot be said of other African countries where corruptive practices such as
kickbacks mean that foreign entities can do whatever they like without any government
questioning of economic practices.
In summary, Botswana’s economic successes can be attributed to the commitment to
ensure that other equally important sectors succeed even in the face of the resource boom.
Again, there is governmental commitment, through workable economic policies, to
ensure that the economy remains on track and strategic to the overall national
development agenda of Botswana. In other parts of Africa, it can be said that the
discovery of natural resources has led to the total neglect of other equally vital sectors of
the economy, something Botswana has clearly avoided.

Political Assessment of Mauritius
Mauritius is another relatively unknown country making giant strides on the African
continent. The CIA World Factbook puts the official population of Mauritius at 1.3
million, with a population growth rate of 0.66% (web: July 2014). Mauritius is an island
in the Indian Ocean, located some 620 miles off the east coast of Africa and about 800
kilometers east of Madagascar, with a landmass approximately 2,030 square kilometers
(Nath and Madhoo 2004:p.2). The country is comprised of Agalega islands, Cargodos
Carajos Shoals (St. Brandon) and Rodrigues (Naeem 2008:p.68, CIA 2014: web). Typical
of the African continent, Mauritius is ethnically and linguistically diverse.
Distributions of the various ethnicities stand at Indo-Mauritian 68%, Creole 27%, SinoMauritian 3% and Franco-Mauritian respectively (CIA 2014: Web, Greig et al
2011:p.159). From literature available, there is an indication of peaceful coexistence
among these groups, thereby demonstrating yet another example of an African country
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not torn apart by civil strife in the name of ethnicity as witnessed in other parts of the
continent. For example, David and Petri (2013) described Mauritius as a “relatively
egalitarian” society, implying a certain level of social equality and equity among the
various ethnicities (p.3). The understanding is that a society modeled on such a social
footing is likely to overlook individual differences and forge ahead in the pursuit of
common goals. This is a very fundamental point to consider in taking into account the
elements responsible for Mauritius eventual success. In sharp contrast to the “ethnolinguistic fractionalization,” blamed for the abysmal performance of most African
governmental policies (Kwesi Fosu 2013:p.12), Mauritius handled ethnic divisions
through power-sharing models, ensuring that no particular ethnic group is left out in the
decision making process.
This is reinforced by governing coalitions in the enclaves of economic and political
decision-making, thereby encouraging peaceful coexistence among the various ethnic
groups (Carroll and Carroll 2000:p.134).
Politically, Mauritius did not escape the misfortunes of colonialism that ravaged the
African continent for centuries. Mauritius’ experiences of colonialism are particularly
interesting, as the territory was occupied by more than one European power at different
times. It is important to point out that conflicting accounts exist on whether the territory
was occupied by indigenes before the arrival of the Europeans. For example, Greig et al
(2011) advance the claim that the territory was unknown and uninhabited by humans
before it was discovered and explored by the Portuguese and subsequently by the Dutch
in the 17th century (p.158). Others dispute that, claiming Arabs and Malay sailors first
knew the territory as early as the 10th century (CIA 2004: web). This being said, there is
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no known account of pre-colonial activity in the territory as evident in other African
countries before the arrival of the Europeans. Thus, if there is to be any visible distinction
between Mauritius and Botswana in our analysis of the two countries, it is important to
point out that, while there were visible and active pre-colonial political and economic
activities and institutionalized traditional African administrative systems in the latter,
and, therefore, the Europeanization of these institutions in colonial times, Mauritius did
not have anything of the sort on record. Therefore, this meant that the Europeans had to
build everything from the foundations. Interestingly, the most basic assumption is to
conclude that Mauritius had European ideals and fundamentals inculcated into its body
politik right from the start.
In spite of the shaky account of pre-colonial political or economic activity in the territory,
the discovery of the island by the Europeans amounted to an occupation of the island by
more than one European power at a time. It is known that Mauritius was first discovered
by the Portuguese, and then occupied by the Dutch. The latter is known to have
abandoned the island in the latter part of the 17th century, thereby leading the French to
capture and assume control of the island by 1715, developing the territory first as a
strategic trade port and subsequently as a naval post overseeing the Indian Ocean to guard
against other European aggression (CIA 2014: web, Greig et al 2011: pp.158-159). The
French would remain in charge until the British captured the island during the
Napoleonic Wars in the 1800’s (ibid). The arrival of the British saw the island gain
strategic importance in British conquests. For example, CIA (2014) notes that Mauritius
played an important role in British involvement in World War II, as it was an important
British naval base, air station, and post for anti-submarine and convoy operations and
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collections of naval signal intelligence (web). Thus, Mauritius was clearly an important
country in British hegemonic conquests at the time.
Mauritius is a parliamentary democracy. The island attained independence from British
rule in 1968, and is described as one of only two countries in Africa which has been
democratic from birth, with Botswana being the other candidate. For that matter, they are
the only two star performers in Africa by far (Frankel 2010: p.17-19). Mauritius has a
unicameral National Assembly, tasked with electing the president every five years. The
National Assembly consists of 70 members, 62 of whom are elected by direct voting with
the remaining 8 appointed by the president. The president also appoints the prime
minister from the party with the majority in the Assembly or in rare cases a coalition
(ACTSA 2010:p.5).
After independence in 1968, Mauritius has continued to remain a stable democracy, with
successive free and fair elections, a positive human rights record, and considerable
foreign capital, making it one of Africa’s stable economies (CIA 2014: web).
Subramanian (2009) notes to this effect that it is by no accident therefore that only two
African countries have posted sustained growth rates after independence, namely
Botswana and Mauritius. Incidentally, these two are the only uninterrupted democracies
on the African continent (p.23). These achievements made in the post-colonial era have
led Mauritius to make considerable development gains on the continent, although it has
done so modestly and on the quiet. The country has been very committed to democratic
institutions such as free and fair elections, multiparty rule, rule of law, an independent
and functional media and fundamental human rights, and these have only culminated in
sustained direct foreign investment in the country (Subramanian 2009:p.21).
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Mauritius’ bureaucratic machinery has also played a pivotal role in Mauritius’ strategic
repositioning politically after independence. Unique to the normal African bureaucratic
experience, Meisenhelder (1997) describes the Mauritian bureaucratic machinery as
being “autonomous” of government influence, and one which formulated national
policies independent of dominant economic groups and with the technical competence
and capital to implement these policies. The policies ranged from diversification of
agriculture into fruits to the promotion of Mauritius as a preferred tourist destination
(pp.292-295). Although this may be deemed an economic rather than political
contribution, the bureaucracy’s ability to operate independently of political interference
meant they were able to support the political machinery with practical policy advice,
thereby steering the country’s political agencies in the right direction. This makes
political and cohort institutions pragmatic and responsible for the needs of the general
population.
Overall, Vandemoortele and Bird (2010) assess a careful constitutional mandate for
minority inclusiveness in public policy making, an electoral process based on equal
representation of ethnic groups, a multiparty system devoid of ethnic bias and a public
policy formation based on extensive consultative mechanisms as the major catalysts
responsible for Mauritius’ success on the continent (p.4). The independence enjoyed by
the bureaucracy also meant that it was capable of making policies and setting targets
which aimed at overall national development. It is significant to say therefore that
Mauritius, mindful of civil conflicts in other parts of Africa, built a political system that
was founded on inclusiveness, local content in policy-making and commitment to
workable democratic institutions.
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Economic Development of Mauritius
Economically, Mauritius, synonymous with Botswana, was not an economic success
story from the onset. So poor and uninspiring was the situation at independence that an
independent study conducted in 1961 to assess the situation concluded that Mauritius was
destined for economic and social failure (Sacerdoti et al, 2005, pp.3-5). Thus, Mauritius
was like any other country emerging from decades of colonial rule and with no economic
prospects. It had meager resources, was vulnerable to external market shocks as well as
exposed to trade shocks, had an under-performing local economy, and displayed a
skewed income distribution (Naeem 2008:p.68). In simple terms, Mauritius was a poor
country, facing a bleak future and no competitive regional trade partners. With the rest of
the world waiting for Mauritius to turn out an economic failure as predicted by the 1961
study, and like several countries on the African continent, the country has emerged from
the initial predictions to be one of the most promising in the world. This did not occur
overnight, but as the result of a careful and well-crafted economic model based on
pragmatic economic policies and a political commitment to turn around initial
predictions. Sir Anerood Jugnauth, president of Mauritius, sharing his views on the
reasons for the economic successes, notes “there is no miracle. It is due to simply hard
work, discipline and will” (Zafar 2011:p.1). In short, Mauritius’ success did not result
from an overnight “miracle” as most analysts seem to attribute but instead the will to
succeed combined with hard work and discipline, both in government and among the
population in the face of negative economic projections. This lifted a country with a
meager per capita GDP income of $350 at independence to a GDP per capita of $11,296
as of 2008, making it one of the strongest GDP indicators in the world (Naeem
2008:p.68, ACTSA 2010:p.1).
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Mauritius is a visible cash crop economy economically. Since evidence of an existence
of an active economic activity on the island in the pre-colonial times remain sketchy, it is
only fair that analysis of Mauritius’ economic engagement with the rest of the world
focuses only on the colonial and post-independence era.
The first evidence of an active economic activity in Mauritius suggests that in 1721, the
French established a large sugar cane holding. The production used slaves brought from
India and other French colonies in Africa to clear large plantations of land. The sugar
cane production thus became the eventual economic mainstay of the Mauritian economy
and the biggest sugar producer in the British market in the early 1860’s (Meisenhelder
1997: p.279). With the British taking over the reins of administration following the
departure of the French, the British followed up the gains made by the French by
structuring the commodity production after the structured plantations of the Caribbean
(Lincoln 2006: p.60). So important was the cash crop that, Meisenhelder (1997) assesses
that at independence, Mauritius possessed capitalist and middle classes who had emerged
due to profits made from sugar production, and who owned land and had access to
education (p.280). Thus, the sugar cane production created a class of people and a
standard of living other African countries could boast of only at the turn of the
millennium. It is fair to say therefore that Mauritius in spite of its fragile economic
projections had at its core individuals or “Sugar Oligarchies” who understood the nature
and orientation of international trade (Meisenhelder 1997: p.281). Their influence and the
importance of sugar as an export commodity helped to shape Mauritius’ economic
engagement with the external environment. In the 1960’s, for example, sugar exports
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accounted for 99 percent of Mauritius’ total export revenue, while the “Sugar
Oligarchies” made attempts to increase local production (Morgan 2002: p.19).
As discussions regarding Botswana indicated, the presence of a resource (natural or manmade) does not necessarily entail the economic success of any country. Mauritius is by
no means an exception. At best, Mauritius is an example of an African country where
pragmatic policies have translated into huge economic successes. An example of these
success-oriented policies centered on the establishment of the Export Processing Zone
(EPZ). Frankel (2010) describes the EPZ as a policy decision directed at certain segments
of exports and aimed at separating particular sectors of the economy from the rest by way
of offering favorable tax and labor policies and as a way to attract foreign direct
investment (p.24). The EPZ in its basic understanding was to attract foreign capital by
creating favorable tax bases and a favorable business environment for industries. Joseph
and Troester (2013) note that the EPZ is a careful, well-planned economic strategy aimed
at segregating the import and export sectors and providing incentives for local and
foreign investors to succeed with corollaries for economic growth (p.7). More precisely,
companies (foreign and local alike) under the EPZ, benefited from preferences such as
duty-free access to imported industrial machinery, reduced taxes and tax holidays, free
transfer of revenue and profits, and lower interest rates and costs of doing business
compared to the other sectors of the economy (Joseph and Troester 2013:p.7). As noted,
the EPZ incentives came in the form of tax holidays and duty-free incentives for local
and foreign businesses alike.
However, more importantly, the EPZ targeted the textile and manufacturing industry.
Besides boosting economic growth, the EPZ was also to introduce skilled and
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experienced labor into the textile and manufacturing industries through cooperation with
experienced foreign partners. The issue is, Mauritius recognized right after independence
in 1968 the shortfalls in labor supply, lack of foreign direct investment and ready markets
for its sugar exports, and the EPZ was a clever attempt at arresting the situation and a
shot at industrialization by way of creating an open and diversified economy and one
positioned to attract foreign human resources, as well as expand infrastructure in the hope
for economic expansion (Meisenhelder 1997:p. 283). Interestingly, other African
countries only started to structure their economies decades later in the economic
structural adjustments period, by which time Mauritius was way ahead of the pack.
To operationalize the EPZ, the government established EPZ factories in the 1970’s and
partnered with Hong Kong and Taiwan (powerhouses in the textile and manufacturing
industries), thereby fueling an influx of foreign skilled and technical labor mainly in the
textile and manufacturing sectors (ibid). Thus, the lack of skilled and expert labor in
Mauritius’ textile and manufacturing sectors was strategically confronted and in the long
term, this resulted in as much as 88 enterprises operating under the EPZ initiative and
more than 18,100 employees accounting for 20 percent of total exports and at least one
third of new employment and 0.44 percent of real GDP by 1977 (ibid: pp.6-9).
The government also initiated and implemented the Sugar Sector Strategic Plan, to
promote and protect sugar exports, which were the mainstay of the economy. This was a
tripartite accord, which brought together the state, local plantation owners, and foreign
stakeholders to commit to strategies aimed at increased sugar production and exports.
This amounted to the introduction of the export levy aimed at encouraging local sugar
exports with governmental support (Meisenhelder 1997:pp.71-284). Fully aware of the
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important role of the “Sugar Oligarchies” in the sugar production industry, the sugar
sector strategic plan was an initiative to boost local production of the commodity with the
firm commitment to ensure that local producers benefited as much from the industry as
their foreign partners.
The plan also amounted to diversifying revenues accrued from the sugar industry to
support and build other sectors of the economy. For example, Meisenhelder (1997) notes
that following recommendations made by the Meade report, the Mauritius government
decided to tax sugar exports and to use the proceeds to provide jobs through a public
works program and to sponsor state economic expansion (pp.283-284). The government
recognized the economic deficiencies early and undertook practical measures to resolve
them right from the onset. The lack of practical steps to resolve the economic woes in
other parts of the continent has largely accounted for the economic mismanagement that
Africa has been engulfed in over the last decades.
Mauritius was also engaged in what Naeem (2008) terms “Sugar diplomacy”. The
authority assesses that a 1953 accord, the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement (CSA) and
another one in Lomé in 1975 granted Mauritius a “Sugar Protocol” (SP) in which the
island nation was guaranteed access to the British and the European Economic
Community markets respectively (p.89). These agreements basically offered Mauritius
special trade preferential treatment in foreign trade negotiations and one accompanied
with fair trade terms, something that was unavailable in other African countries playing
equally important roles in world economic affairs (Naeem 2008:pp.89-90). Other African
countries had to wait well into the 2000’s to receive such preferential treatment through
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the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) for example under President Bush’s
Administration.
Regarding the decision to diversify monies accrued from sugar exports to other sectors of
the economy, the move initiated by the Mauritian government was to give equal
importance and commitment to other equal sectors of the economy. Thus, an overdependence on sugar as the sole foreign exchange earner was carefully avoided. For
example, Meisenhelder (1997) points out that the government, upon recommendations
put forward by the Meade committee, decided to use export tax monies to fund social
initiatives and improve the wages of plantation and factory workers. The revenues also
fund social programs such as education, health, rural infrastructure and electrification
among others (p.285). This was particularly a good move due to external price shocks
experienced by African countries in foreign markets. The diversification of revenue to
other sectors of the economy is especially important as it ensures that the various sectors
of the economy grow on an equal footing. Developing the sugar sector to the total neglect
of other sectors of the economy, as was the case of other countries in Africa, would have
had dangerous repercussions on Mauritius’ economy and overall development.
It is important to point out that Mauritius’ diversification initiative followed two paths;
one to attract foreign capital and the other to serve as a platform for export-oriented
manufacturing and processing (an initiative in line with Meade committee
recommendations). Policy commendations such as the one provided for by the Meade
committee and EPZ lifted the Mauritian economy beyond initial projections as well as
introduced expansions into the tourism Sector, thereby generating jobs as well as
attracting foreign direct investments (Lincoln 2006:p.64).
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However, inasmuch as the above played a pivotal role in lifting Mauritius’ economy, it
is equally critical to point out that other equally important factors account for Mauritius
major economic successes. One of these important factors is Mauritius’ attractive
investment location. For example, Greig et al (2011) note that Mauritius remained a
particularly important maritime point and a strategic geographic location in European
colonial trade until the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and, therefore, an attractive
investment location (p.21). The island is also known for its exotic landscape, making it a
preferred tourist destination. All these raked in foreign exchange and direct foreign
investment.
Aside from sugar exports, exports in textiles and manufacturing, which combined make
up 30% of GDP (Meisenhelder 1997: p.290), the island is also known and praised for her
zero-tolerance towards corruption. Transparency International, for example, recognizes
Mauritius for being only second to Botswana in terms of corruption assessment on the
African continent (Frankel 2010: p.19). This is particularly a good example, especially in
a continent plagued with never-ending stories of corruption and government
embezzlement.
Last, but not least, and critical to Mauritius’ economic success, is the country’s tourism
sector. With the country’s exotic geography and landscape, Mauritius is by far an ideal
destination for tourists from the island’s colonial past and also due to its bi-lingual status.
Joseph and Troester (2013) assess that between 1980 and 1999, the number of tourists
arriving in the country doubled from 291,550 to 578,085 and the tourism industry grew
with the addition of new hotels and restaurants, increases in employment and grossed
between $42 million to $244 million in terms of foreign exchange earnings and with a

31
growth rate of 13.0 percent per annum (pp.7-9). Even more important, monies accrued
were re-invested in the industry, making it one of the biggest tourism destinations on the
African continent.
In summary, Mauritius’ economic successes are by no means a miracle, but an example
of an economic policy crafted with local content combined with a well-managed
governmental “sugar diplomacy” and with revenues accrued from sugar exports
diversified to expand the economy and afford it more economic opportunities. This is
something about which other African countries have clearly been absent minded.

Existing Comparative Framework
In the literature analyzed thus far, it is imperative and evident to point to the fact that both
Botswana and Mauritius emerged from colonial rule with similar political and economic
projections and with each projected to either fail or have little or no chance of success.
Each with relative population sizes, they both possessed the usual African ethnic
diversity which in most cases has been a recipe for civil conflicts and a hindrance to
national development. In pointing these elements out, the idea is that these two countries
were in no way different from other African countries that equally emerged from the
shadows of colonial rule.
The fact is that colonial rule ravaged and impoverished the African economies and left
the political institutions in a dilapidated state at the time of independence. Most African
nations were not fully and adequately prepared to handle government business, and this
meant that politics occurred more on predatory lines, further crippling the African
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economies and leaving them with a lack of competitive state vis-à-vis global political
and economic engagements.
Of the two cases under study, interesting comparisons are also drawn from their
abundance of natural resource wealth. Like most countries on the African landscape,
Botswana and Mauritius are endowed with natural wealth, but what makes their examples
unique is the systematic and institutional nature within which revenues accrued from
these resources have been distributed and diversified for national development without
any ethnic or tribal biases. The natural resource wealth of Botswana and Mauritius,
diamonds and sugarcane respectively, has been backed by effective policy aimed at
overall national development, but more so with less reliance on these resources, knowing
their contentious nature and the ability to cause civil unrest. Monies accrued from these
sectors have been diversified to expand other sectors of the economy, while government
policy has been efficient in evolving itself to correspond with global market changes.
There is also an element of local content in policy-making in transactions with foreign
multinationals, ensuring that local businesses benefit equally with their foreign
counterparts. This is a huge shift from other examples of African countries blessed with
natural resources and where a few elements of the government control the resources and
revenue from it to the detriment of the larger population and where revenue is not
properly accounted for. In other countries like Nigeria and Ghana, it is clear that
governments’ over reliance on a single commodity as the sole foreign exchange earner
has led to huge lapses in the economy in the wake of external price shocks.
Aside from the gains made from the two predominant natural resources, Botswana and
Mauritius have safeguarded other sectors of the local economy by giving credence to
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other sectors of the economy, both fiscal and policy, as well as ensuring that overall
economic growth of the nation is impacted or at least influenced by other sectors of the
economy. This has equally been achieved by giving both fiscal and policy importance to
these other sectors of the economy in government decision-making.
A careful consideration is also the fact that both countries maintained closer ties with
their former colonial masters, and this to some extent worked in the favor of Botswana
and Mauritius. While it is common knowledge that the British, French, Portuguese and
other colonial powers never fully left the continent even after independence, for the
reason that Africa was endowed with natural wealth, and for that matter, an asset to the
European economies, Botswana and Mauritius have maintained strong diplomatic and
economic relations especially with Britain and other Western powers.
Examples of these partnerships are the visible political institutions and systems modeled
after Western-style democracy and democratic orientations, as well as EU economic
initiatives which have over the years ensured that Botswana and Mauritius can sell their
goods on European markets and enjoy accorded benefits without any restrictions. These
two countries have had the opportunity to source interest-free loans to further develop
their economies due to existing political and economic partnerships. Although there is
debate as to what extent these partnerships and collaborations really benefit African
countries, we cannot underestimate or ignore entirely the enormous contributions such
partnerships make. In saying this, we imply that such partnerships are important, but
African governments must not be shortsighted in thinking that partnerships, political or
economic, themselves bring development. They must take the initiative to painstakingly
study and scrutinize in detail the content of such co-operations to ensure the local
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economies benefit as much as what their foreign counterparts seek to gain. In Africa,
governments have suffered from bad political and economic deals, which from the onset
promised to be the best of collaborations. In the case of Botswana and Mauritius, the two
countries have ensured that transactions between them and foreign governments benefited
the local folks and were done with local content in the decision-making phase. This calls
into being extensive consultation and transparency on the part of African governments in
the whole process, as well as commitment to due process in dealing with collaborations
with foreign or sub-regional entities in the attempt to strengthen the economy.
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Chapter III
Political and Economic Development Challenges: Not a Unique Case After all
Since the beginning of my analysis, I have been careful not to shower praises on
Botswana and Mauritius as most of the literature seems to suggest. It is important to note
that these two countries have had and continue to have their little evils that plague them.
In so doing, however, it is the manner in which these challenges, to which I turn my
attention, have been tackled that stands out in the African example. The mere fact that
these two countries, in spite of their enormous achievements, are still categorized as
“developing nations” suggests that there is more progress to be done before a total or
holistic consideration of their successes.
Developmental challenges in Botswana
In spite of the huge developmental gains of Botswana on the African continent, especially
in the natural resource sector, the country has for a large part had to deal with internal
political upheavals. Acemoglu et al (2001) note, for example, that the political machinery
is meritocratic, centered around the few who make policies to exploit the whole and with
large powers over resources, culminating in internal conflicts and struggles for control
over existing resources (p.2). The noblest suggestion to assume is that this internal
struggle has not assumed the level of full-scale civil conflicts as evident in other African
countries, like Liberia and Sierra Leone, but instances of this nature have the potential to
distort political and economic gains and create social tensions which have the capacity to
explode. In this regard, we can say that a country with this sort of internal upheavals is
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only sitting on a time bomb. There is a probable course to explain therefore that
Botswana’s resource industry has only benefitted a few rather than the whole.
Politically, Botswana is farther from the enclaves of success than perceived. The most
common critique is that the country has been ruled and dominated by a single political
party (Botswana Democratic Party) since the country’s independence from colonial rule
in 1966. Brown and Kaiser (2007) note, “given the absence of alternations of political
leadership, Africa’s ‘premier’ democracy has yet to demonstrate its ability to withstand
the challenges of genuine political change” (pp.4-5). Thus, given that there has not been
an alternation in the country’s political leadership, we cannot conclude that all is well.
Furthermore, in the case of Botswana, there is ample evidence for the case of political
domination by elitists who originate from the Tswana at the expense of the other ethnic
groupings. Although analysts seem to suggest that there exist no qualms between the
Tswana and other ethnic groups, there exist unobtrusive subconscious misgivings about
the situation which could ultimately spell doom for the nation. Thus, political change is
an important element in an ethnically charged setting like Botswana.
Again, in spite of Botswana’s modest growth, there is evidence of high poverty levels in
the country. Scores of the population remain largely unemployed or unemployable, and
because of that experience high poverty levels. Failure to address high poverty and
income inequality levels among the rural and urban poor stems from the government’s
failure to restructure the economy to confront current situations (Taylor 2002: pp.21-22).
It remains important therefore that the government restructures the economy to meet
current demands and come up with social interventions to confront rising levels of
poverty and provide jobs for the people. Government can achieve this by encouraging
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employable skills training to reduce unemployment levels. It is also important that
government recognizes that the global economy is not static, so as to come up with social
interventions to adequately confront changing trends. The poverty levels are also due to
the uneven resource distribution levels noted earlier.
Botswana also faces the challenge of high HIV/AIDS levels. For a country with the status
of Botswana, with modest economic and political growth, this remains a bad precedent in
objective analysis of general national growth. Botswana has one of the highest HIVinfected rates in the world, and as of 2003, as many as 38 percent of the total population
had been infected (Cook and Sarkin 2010: p. 485). This suggests low life expectancy,
ranked 223 overall in the global HIV/AIDS index and issues with infected persons’
stigmatization rendering the situation a humanitarian as well as a health concern (Cook
and Sarkin 2010:pp. 485-486). This poses a serious economic challenge to Botswana’s
economic growth, as huge sums of money are required to combat the epidemic. The
number of infected person’s also means that productivity levels in the economy are lower
compared to other countries at similar economic growth levels as Botswana. This
situation has long-term implications for the general economic significance of
Botswana in terms of its global positioning.
Lastly, Botswana’s over dependence on diamonds as the mainstay of economic
development gives cause for worry. The most basic reason is that no country can succeed
by being dependent on a single natural resource. It is critical to note that such resources
are prone to price shocks and devaluations on the global market stage. While there is no
doubt that diamonds have contributed tremendously to shaping and placing Botswana’s
economy in the position it is today, and even more important in avoiding the Dutch
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disease which plagued several African countries, there is that reminder that natural
resource reserves do run out and can plunge the country into serious economic
consequences in the aftermath. In the most probable explanation, the African
Development Bank (2009) assessment of Botswana’s diamond deposits between 2009
and 2013 concluded that the country’s diamond production would decline sharply after
2020 and completely by 2030 (p.3). With this projection in sight, it becomes prudent that
the country prepare for the future without diamond resource money flowing into the
economy.
Developmental challenges in Mauritius
Like Botswana, Mauritius faces a host of challenges. The country’s modest economic
gains and political stability has not stopped it from experiencing some of the problems
that confront nations with such economic prospect. One of the challenges that readily
come to mind is the country’s social tension that exists between the various ethnic
groups. As noted, the island was unoccupied before European discovery and subsequent
occupation. It is on record therefore that slaves, mostly of Indian and African descent,
were brought in by the Europeans as labor and subsequently settled into the general
population at independence in 1968. Frankel (2010) assesses that the ethnic tensions are
“unconducive to growth” (p.12). The ethnic divisions remain a concern it has stoked and
continue to course civil strife in other parts of the African continent. Thus, it is always
difficult to forecast a country’s overall economic growth and sustenance anytime an
atmosphere of civil tensions exists.
Mauritius economy large dependence on sugar as the biggest earner of foreign exchange
means it also prone to windfalls and external price shocks as was evident in Botswana’s
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example. The dangerous aspect of a country heavily reliant on a particular commodity
for foreign exchange is that external price shocks can happen suddenly, without warning,
and this can send years of economic gains tumbling. ACTSA (2010) notes for example
that the global economic crisis in 2009 sent the Mauritius dropping from 5.1 percent in
2008 to 2.8 percent in spite of the Mauritius government’s economic stimulus measures
in place (p.6). Stressing the vulnerability of the Mauritius economy to unforeseen shocks,
YeungLamKo (1998) assesses two situations deemed precarious to the Mauritius
economy. First, the authority assesses two cyclones that hit Mauritius in the 1970’s and it
enormous impact on Mauritius sugar production, causing sugar outputs and exports to
drop between 525,000 and 690,000 metric tons in 1975 and 1979 respectively. The
second being, the 1979 oil price increases causing world sugar prices to tumble and the
resulting financial consequences on the Mauritius economy (pp.16-17). Thus, these
instances remain largely unforeseen and for that matter poses a serious challenge to the
general economic and political wellbeing of the country.
The notion of “Sugar Oligarchies” also compounds the above problem because it goes to
support the perception that real economic growth in terms of actual revenue is controlled
or in the hands of few people and, therefore, a hasty assumption to conclude that
Mauritius is holistically developed. In the face of this challenge, government needs to
encourage more diversification of revenue resources in boosting general economic
growth and equity in the distribution of resource wealth. Government needs to carefully
dismantle the structures of “Sugar Oligarchies” and monopoly to ensure equity
distribution of resources accrued from sugar exports and take steps to advance the
economy not in the interest of a particular group but in the whole.
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Lastly, Mauritius also faces the challenge of her textile prospects dwindling in the global
marketplace. Currently, China’s accession and influence of WTO and MFA trade
regulations and changes in the global textile and clothing industry meant that Mauritius’s
textile industry which averaged $1 billion between 1998 and 2004 averaged just $800
million between 2005 and 2006 (Subramanian 2009: p.22). This situation is compounded
by the European Union’s decision to cease granting trade preferences under the EBA
accord to Mauritius due to Mauritius’ middle-income status and even more disturbing,
Mauritius does not qualify under the AGOA third-party fabric rule of origin
(Subramanian 2009: p.22). This means Mauritius’ textile industry does not enjoy
unrestricted access to the European market decades earlier and, for this reason, revenue
from this sector is expected to fall tremendously.
It becomes evident from this analysis that Botswana and Mauritius re-orient their
development strategies that has brought them so much prosperity in the past to confront
current and emerging challenges if they intend to remain relevant in the global
marketplace. Even more important, these challenges impact overall national growth and
could alter the way the rest of the world perceive these two countries. It becomes prudent
therefore not to perceive the successes of these two countries as a “miracle” or unique
case but instead a work in progress.

Comparative Analysis: A Pragmatic outlook for Continued Growth
Botswana and Mauritius have together recorded some impressive growth levels in the
past decades, and while this research is not to single them out as unique cases, they
remain an incredible model to the rest of the African continent. From a modest

41
background after colonial rule, these two countries have recorded sustained economic
growth, stable political leadership, and internal security unparalleled on the African
continent. While there is the need to admire these growth levels, it is also important to
envisage the areas that have made these two countries a success both politically and
economically and provided a path for the rest of the continent to follow.
As noted, both Botswana and Mauritius have recorded modest and sustained economic
growth in the past decades. One of the reasons responsible and largely ignored is their
relative population size. With Botswana and Mauritius’ populations pegged at 2.1 and 1.3
million respectively, their relative sizes leave similarities in painting a comparative
analysis. This is not to suggest that countries with smaller populations in Africa are more
successful than their counterparts with larger populations. The most basic explanation,
however, is that, countries of this modest size have avoided the internal ethnic tensions
and civil strife that have engulfed countries with larger populations like Nigeria and DR
Congo, which had bigger economic prospects than Botswana and Mauritius at the time of
independence. In such smaller populations, governments has a better overview of
challenges confronting the populace and can institute workable policies to confront the
situations. Examples are the EPZ and Botswana’s local content oriented diamond
policies.
The two countries have remained stable democracies and kept pragmatic political
institutions. In a continent notorious for numerous political upheavals, Botswana and
Mauritius have kept out of this sort of unpalatable experience that has sent most African
countries to the abyss of economic stagnation and political instability. While we cannot
rule out entirely the existence of political tensions in Botswana and Mauritius, these two
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countries have very much committed to workable and pragmatic democratic institutions
in the form of free and fair elections, free press, legislature and constitutions. While other
countries on the African continent have witnessed numerous military takeovers resulting
from bad leadership, Botswana and Mauritius have kept out of this disaster and instead
committed to these structures. With similar colonial pasts, these two countries, unlike
others in Africa, have maintained and built up political structures and institutions
inherited from their colonial past, and these have relatively influenced their political
stability.
Botswana and Mauritius are both to a large extent single dominant resource economies.
There is ample evidence to suggest that these singular resources account for the
countries’ economic successes. Botswana is a global key player in the diamond industry
with Mauritius a key player in the sugar production and export industry. While there is
evidence to suggest other industries exist which have played equally important roles in
achieving economic success in these respective countries, the aforementioned industries
have been instrumental in expanding the economies of these countries in that revenues
accrued from these respective industries were employed to diversify and expand the rest
of the economy. There is even evidence to suggest that, without the thriving diamond and
sugar industries in Botswana and Mauritius respectively, the economic fortunes of these
two countries would have been in shambles. Although the general consensus is that the
existence of a particular resource or industry in a country does not necessarily amount to
economic success, Botswana and Mauritius remain model examples due to their
commitment to utilize these industries for the overall national development.
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Last but not least, it is important to point out that Botswana and Mauritius have
benefited from policy choices. Botswana’s and Mauritius’ economic decisions resemble
free market capitalism and ones positioned to attract foreign direct investment. The
various policies were development-oriented and geared towards economic expansion. In
several respects, however, these policies were inherited from the colonial past, modified
and implemented with a global outlook. Thus, while other African countries had policies,
these lacked the global focus that policies such as the EPZ had.
In sum, the examples of Botswana and Mauritius are interesting cases in economic and
political discussions, especially in a continent with fewer than normal successes. With
both countries emerging from colonial rule with negative projections for economic
growth and relative chances for success, both countries have emerged as two of the
fastest growing economies in the world and two of the most developed on the African
continent. These two countries, therefore, present the rest of the African continent a
blueprint to follow in repositioning Africa on the path of economic and political
empowerment. These two examples point to the fact that Africa as a continent still
possesses the prospects for growth, and Botswana and Mauritius present a perfect case
study or starting point for further studies in positioning the rest of Africa on the path of
prosperity.
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Chapter IV
Economic Growth Statistics and Interpretations
The gross domestic product (GDP) of a country is arguably one of the most telling signs
of the country’s economic success. It is calculated by totaling the goods and services
produced in the country within a year. This calculation varies greatly by country and is
most useful for economic growth when measured over a number of years.

Figure 1. Comparison of GDP growth of Mauritius and Botswana over 33 years (See
Appendix for Table 1)

Botswana and Mauritius have both seen stable growth in this economic indicator see
(Figure 1). Both countries have increased GDP growth percentage by 2%-6% yearly
between 1980 and 2002. However between the years 2003-2013, the GDP yearly growth
percentage quadrupled (9%-26%). The growth is remarkable for countries of their
population size (Botswana: 2.02 million; Mauritius: 1.29). Both, not only increasing at a

45
faster rate than countries with populations 8-10 times their sizes (Burkina Faso and
Madagascar), but also increase at a higher production rate (see Figure 2).
The GDP per capita is the value of goods divided by the country’s population. More

Figure 2. Comparison of GDP of 6 sub-Saharan African countries (see Appendix for
Table 2)

Figure 3. Comparison of GDP per capita for 9 sub-Saharan African countries over 23
years (see Appendix for Table 3)
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densely populated countries, like Nigeria and Ghana, produce and increase production
growth at a much higher rate; however the standard of living (based on GDP per capita
and economic freedom) cannot compare to that of Botswana and Mauritius. As shown by
the comparison of the GDP per capita (see Figure 3), Botswana GDP per capita is 9 times
greater than Ghana’s, and Mauritius’ is 8 times greater. Both countries’ GDP per capita
individually about 6 times more than that of Nigeria. Botswana has had one of the
world’s highest economic growth rate since its indepencence. Although economic growth
was negative in 2009 after global ecomomic crisis, through economic displine, the coutry
was able to change from being one of the poorest countries in the world to a middle
income country by 2013. Mauritius has also been able to transform itself from a lowincome, agriculturally based economy to a middle-income economy with blooming
finanical and industrial sectors. It has also maintained a steady and strong economic
growth rate over the last several decades, which allow them to lead the way in economic
freedom in Africa.

Fig4. Top African Countries by Economic Freedom for 2011(see Appendix for Table 4)
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The Wall Street Journal and The Heritage Foundation have researched the Economic
Freedom Index since 1995.These indices gauge the economic success of countries around

Figure 5. Overall Economic Freedom Index of Sub-Saharan African countries over
10 years (see Appendix for Table 5)

the world. Economic freedom is the right for every human to his or her own land and
labor. A higher rank on this index indicates an economically free society where the
government freely allows the movement of goods, capital and labor. Botswana and
Mauritius economic freedom index is within the top 50 of the 178 ranked countries
worldwide (Botswana: 36 Mauritius: 10). Mauritius is and has been the most
economically free country in the Sub-Saharan region for the past 5 years, while Botswana
has moved up through the ranks, from 5th in 2011 (See Figure 4) to 2nd in 2015.
Botswana and Mauritius exhibits impressive overall economic freedom index (see Figure
5) compared to other African countries on the chart. What sets Botswana and Mauritius
from the rest of the pack is their sustainability ratios, which, compared to the other
countries on the charts, has witnessed a continued growth albeit external price
fluctuations and a commitment to healthy economic practices. To be fair, other African
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countries on the list are not far off. South Africa, Madagascar, Namibia and Cape Verde
are all witnessing impressive outings in overall economic freedom index. For
sustainability purposes, these will have to incorporate the trade and economic practices

Figure 6. External Debt of Mauritius and Botswana from 2000-2012 (see
Appendix for Table 6)

that Botswana and Mauritius have been accustomed to within the last decades.
Botswana and Mauritius exhibits two countries with sustained external debt patterns (see
Figure 6). Though this is not a so encouraging practice, almost all countries in the
international system are indebted including the most developed nations. Per the numbers,
a healthy external debt as exhibited by Botswana and Mauritius is encouraged. A
carefully monitored external debt pattern as showed by the two countries is necessary to
attract foreign direct investment for continued economic growth, encourages multilateral
financial initiatives such as the World Bank Group, IMF, Paris Club, London Club, the
Africa Development Bank Group, the European Investment Bank Group, among others to
conduct business activities with countries knowing that these countries are capable of
paying back monies loaned them as well as encourages business initiates and economic
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partnerships between governments. Thus, while foreign financial institutions and

Figure 7. External Debt over 12 years for 12 Sub-Saharan countries. (See
Appendix for Table 7)

governments might be cautious in conducting businesses with the likes of South Africa
and Nigeria due to their high external debt levels, Botswana and Mauritius largely escape
these precautionary measures and sensitive scrutiny ,and, for that matter, access to
external open market and fair trade opportunities. A healthy external debt also accounts
for private sector growth, strong currency and an overall strong economy. Klein (1994):
External Debt Management: An Introduction. World Bank Technical Paper No 245.
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Chapter V
Conclusions and Recommendations
My observations, thus far and as far as this study is concerned, are that there is more that
still needs to be done by these two countries in order to be fully recognized as the giants
of Africa. From the graphical presentations, really these two countries are not so unique a
case from other African countries that surprisingly are performing equally and creditably
well. This goes to suggest that Africa is gradually emerging from its former shadows of
civil unrest and economic mismanagement. Economic projections of countries such as
Namibia, South Africa, Nigeria and Ghana, among others, strongly suggests a continent
with greater economic prospects and one far in better shape than one left behind after
colonialism. This calls for better and improved policy-making processes. Policy
frameworks must be streamlined by efficient, independent and well equipped political
institutions and corporate entities able to monitor global economic changes and ensure
that formulated policies do correspond with any external shocks.
Saying that Botswana and Mauritius are not so much of a unique case is in no way to take
the shine away from the credible feats that these two countries have accomplished. Given
the fact fewer people or international bodies least expected them to achieve this much
both politically and economically, it is important to say Botswana and Mauritius clearly
served as a beacon of hope for the rest of Africa both politically and economically.
Although few will agree with this assertion due to the huge natural resource wealth that
these two countries are endowed with, it is equally important to point out that only a few
would have expected these levels of political and economic development in the years

51
post-independence. And even with the discovery of natural wealth, few would have
expected that revenues from this sector would be explored for the overall prosperity of
the nation given the continents’ long history with the “Dutch disease.” In several respects
this study has sought not to sing the praises of Botswana and Mauritius, however, their
development levels remain entirely commendable. Often times there is the tendency for
developing nations to sink into the trajectory of political instability and economic
mismanagement once they are showered with so much praise for having performed well
politically and economically and therefore there is a need to be cautious in our attempts
to single out Botswana and Mauritius as political and economic safe havens especially in
Africa. It is prudent to recognize that these two countries are emerging from a region still
in dire need of political and economic transformation. The spotlight is on Botswana and
Mauritius for the reason that they serve as unique examples of current inroads being
made by African countries politically and economically, and, therefore, also of the need
to structure effective policies to correspond with these developments.
Additionally, institutions like the African Development Bank (ADB) and current
initiatives like the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) must be tailored to the
African terrain to be effective. More of such African-centered institutions and initiatives
are needed to boost the economic prospects of the continent. The ADB, for example,
must be encouraged and endowed to perform some of the roles currently handled by the
World Bank and IMF. The ADB must come up with initiatives to support local
enterprises as well as support African governments with loans and grants to facilitate
their economic restructuring efforts. This point is particularly significant in that almost all
political and economic development made by African governments is funded or
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supported by the IMF, World bank or other donor agencies, and this in itself is not very
desirable. As Africa seeks to change her political and economic fortunes, it becomes
increasingly significant to look for sources for these projects in ways wholly funded by
homegrown African financial institutions and local business investors. Investment from
local investors can be incorporated into the overall developmental strategy to ensure that
local businesses equally benefit from the economic gains of the country. Local
investment and support for the economy must be a sustained policy commitment, as
much as that involving foreign direct investment and donors. Homegrown investment
support in government economic efforts is often lacking because policies regulating such
transactions are often or largely structured to suit foreign direct investment only.
Economically, this area is something we can accuse both Botswana and Mauritius of
being largely lacking, but as Africa continues to make more economic strides, this
becomes an inevitable condition. As Africa continues to grow, it cannot at the same time
continue to rely on the Bretton-Woods institutions or foreign donors. It must look for
ways to be economically self-sufficient. The call here is to prioritize local content and
input in growing the economies of Africa and with the same or exact policy backing and
support accorded foreign direct investors and allied bodies. This will boost local investor
confidence in their effort to contribute towards building the economies. Japan, for
example, is noted for large percentages of local contributions to economic development.
This brings a sense of involvement in nation building.
Overall my general assessment is that:
1. Africa can generally improve politically and economically. Politically, commitment to
established workable democratic institutions is key to ensuring that government is
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accountable and with policies carefully crafted to suit the African terrain. Governments
must submit themselves to the tenets of these institutions and ensure that they operate
away from the harsh realities of active politicking. Economically, local content in
economic policy or decision-making is paramount. Local enterprises ought to be
supported by the government to benefit from various economic policy provisions like
their foreign counterparts.
2. The experiences of Botswana and Mauritius go to support the notion that diversifying
the economy and not relying solely on a single foreign exchange commodity is in itself
essential to ensuring the overall economic development of a country. As impoverished as
the two countries were post-independence, a diversified economic strategy has ensured
that these two economies were not dependent on a single commodity. This is a sharp
contrast from other African nations which, upon the discovery of natural deposits,
abandoned entirely or paid little attention to other sectors of the economy. Botswana and
Mauritius were simply cautious not to rely on diamonds and sugarcane production
respectively, but instead used the monies accrued from these sectors to first straighten
and then develop other sectors of their respective economies.
3. African countries and governments ought to be committed and spearhead their own
development. There is no doubt that collaboration with the outside world is significant,
but in this case more regional collaboration in terms of trade and economic integration is
important to ensure that sub-regionally and regionally, economies can collaborate to grow
and expand their economic frontiers. Regional bodies like SADC, COMESA, and
ECOWAS, among others, can collaborate effectively to ensure that there are workable
provisions and legislation in place regulating sub-regional and regional trade, as well as
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resource institutions like the ADB, to enable it to take up more economically responsible
roles. As Africa gradually emerges from its political and economic shadows, regional and
sub-regional collaborations are key to sustained economic growth.
4. One must be cautious in singing the praises of Botswana and Mauritius and for that
matter any other African country in similar standing because Botswana and Mauritius
still struggle with HIV/AIDS, communicable diseases, high rates of unemployment, lack
of competitive sub-regional trade partnerships and political and economic institutions still
heavily modeled after western agreements. For these reasons and others, it becomes
premature to start singling out Botswana and Mauritius as Africa’s political and
economic havens. This study has largely been mindful of this fact and avoided drawing
conclusions to that effect.
5. Africa’s political and economic landscape, with Botswana and Mauritius as worthy
examples, is still largely in the transformative phase. This calls for implementing wellguarded policies that stand the test of time and yet are amenable to changing trends;
policies that are able to conform to the demands of the global political economy. Africa
for the most part has suffered from poor political and economic policies in the postindependence era, and going forward, there is the need to guard against policies which
instead roll back the gains made over the course of the last few decades.
In retrospect, this study has undertaken a careful analysis of the political and economic
development strategies of Botswana and Mauritius, and how they have managed to
achieve so much even after inheriting an impoverished economic and poor political setup
at independence. Emerging from a background such that few analysts expected them to
succeed, these two countries seem to suggest to the rest of the African continent that,
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with workable and accountable political institutions coupled with pragmatic and better
management of economic resources, any country of the continent is bound to succeed in
similar or greater fashion. Africa thus possesses the capacities, as demonstrated by
Botswana and Mauritius, to rise and be counted among the political and economic
powerhouses of the world.
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Appendix
Table 1: Comparison of GDP growth of Mauritius and Botswana over 33 years
Year

Mauritius

Botswana

1980

1.14

1.06

1981

1.15

1.07

1982

1.08

1.01

1983

1.09

1.17

1984

1.04

1.24

1985

1.08

1.11

1986

1.47

1.39

1987

1.89

1.97

1988

2.14

2.64

1989

2.19

3.08

1990

2.65

3.79

1991

2.86

3.94

1992

3.22

4.15

1993

3.26

4.16

1994

3.56

4.26

1995

4.04

4.73

1996

4.42

4.85

1997

4.19

5.02

1998

4.17

4.79

1999

4.29

5.48

2000

4.58

5.79

2001

4.54

5.49

2002

4.77

5.44

2003

5.61

7.51

2004

6.39

8.96

2005

6.28

9.93

2006

6.73

10.13

2007

7.79

10.94

2008

9.64

11.11

2009

8.83

10.11

2010

9.72

13.75

2011

11.25

15.29

2012

11.44

14.54

2013

11.94

14.79

Note: Amounts are in USD Billions.
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Table 2: Comparison of GDP of 6 Sub-Saharan African countries
Cape
Verde

Burkina
Faso

Namibia

4.04

0.14

1.93

2.43

1.07

3.59

0.14

1.78

2.26

1.08

1.01

3.53

0.14

1.75

2.13

1.09

1.17

3.51

0.14

1.6

2.31

1984

1.04

1.24

2.94

0.13

1.46

1.96

1985

1.08

1.11

2.86

0.14

1.55

1.62

1986

1.47

1.39

3.26

0.19

2.04

1.82

1987

1.89

1.97

2.57

0.24

2.37

2.31

1988

2.14

2.64

2.44

0.26

2.62

2.51

1989

2.19

3.08

2.5

0.27

2.62

2.55

1990

2.65

3.79

3.08

0.31

3.1

2.8

1991

2.86

3.94

2.65

0.32

3.14

3.01

1992

3.22

4.15

3.02

0.36

2.24

3.45

1993

3.26

4.16

3.37

0.49

2.33

3.22

1994

3.56

4.26

2.98

0.41

1.9

3.64

1995

4.04

4.73

3.16

0.49

2.38

3.94

1996

4.42

4.85

3.99

0.5

2.59

3.95

1997

4.19

5.02

3.55

0.49

2.45

4.1

1998

4.17

4.79

3.74

0.52

2.8

3.83

1999

4.29

5.48

3.72

0.62

3.01

3.82

2000

4.58

5.79

3.88

0.67

2.61

3.9

2001

4.54

5.49

4.53

0.6

2.81

3.55

2002

4.77

5.44

3.3

0.6

3.21

3.36

2003

5.61

7.51

5.47

2.99

4.21

4.93

2004

6.39

8.96

4.36

3.13

4.84

6.61

2005

6.28

9.93

5.04

1.6

5.46

7.26

2006

6.73

10.13

5.52

1.63

5.84

7.98

2007

7.79

10.94

7.34

1.75

6.76

8.84

2008

9.64

11.11

9.41

1.91

8.35

8.49

2009

8.83

10.11

8.55

2.08

8.35

8.72

2010

9.72

13.75

8.7

1.66

9.21

11.14

2011

11.25

15.29

9.85

1.86

10.4

12.45

2012

11.44

14.54

9.88

1.76

10.73

13.4

2013

11.94

14.79

10.8

1.89

11.58

12.58

Year

Mauritius

Botswana Madagascar

1980

1.14

1.06

1981

1.15

1982
1983

Note: Amounts are in USD Billions.
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Table 3: Comparison of GDP per capita for 9 sub-Saharan African countries over
23 years
Year

MS

BW

MAD

CV

BF

ZA

GH

NI

SA

1990

3037.46

3730.68

328.42

709.9

269.32

676.83

376.59

590.05

4855.52

1991

3138.13

3894.68

298.58

704.5

285.99

660.28

385.56

571.65

4708.03

1992

3298.81

3897.32

293.11

761.99

279.04

633.77

389.42

559.82

4512.27

1993

3425.61

3865.84

290.27

806

280.98

661.3

397.13

557.38

4472.49

1994

3517.7

3903.5

281.25

934.96

277.02

590.08

399.39

548.58

4519.51

1995

3637.12

4076.12

277.29

1041.17

284.92

559.43

405.35

533.42

4560.64

1996

3801.28

4213.86

274.47

1132.9

307.68

582.99

413.93

546.24

4652.37

1997

3967.48

4452.22

275.74

1232.41

318.15

586.28

421.49

547.69

4667.48

1998

4164.32

4392.14

277.65

1359.43

331.97

559.92

431.47

548.66

4582.61

1999

4219.06

4725.22

281.59

1483.31

346.63

557.15

440.28

537.63

4578.79

2000

4554.92

4735.54

285.96

1663.55

343.11

561.79

445.88

552.19

4652.34

2001

4621.49

4672.94

294

1669.04

355.36

574.44

452.46

562.23

4682.78

2002

4678.94

4886.34

249.07

1724.82

362.99

578.79

461.04

568.97

4759.27

2003

4800

5046.47

265.36

1766.84

380.1

593.44

472.7

612.13

4836.22

2004

5032.28

5121.16

271.17

1919.72

385.7

609.82

486.38

797.88

4990.87

2005

5054.32

5294.38

275.48

2030.7

407

625.85

501.86

804.15

5185.85

2006

5214.23

5655.07

281.08

2177.82

421.96

647.36

520.27

847.54

5404.95

2007

5487.57

6084.31

290.22

2499.01

424.5

668.64

539.67

881.59

5630.1

2008

5752.79

6261.11

302.24

2660.05

436.11

689.33

570.36

911.96

5757.39

2009

5895.7

5716.97

282.05

2620.51

436.09

710

578.57

949.01

5594.81

2010

6109.78

6152.73

273.22

2648.66

457.23

741.44

610.18

995.68

5694.23

2011

6319.71

6476.05

268.4

2737.19

462.92

767.93

685.98

1013.55

5820.96

2012

6497.85

6693.75

267.15

2749.48

492.76

797.93

730.22

1052.18

5885.22

2013

6679.21

7028.05

265.25

2738.31

510.21

821.56

766.05

1097.97

5916.46

Note: Amounts are in USD
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Key: MS – Mauritius; BW – Botswana; MAD – Madagascar; CV – Cape Verde; BF –
Burkina Faso; ZA –Zambia; GH – Ghana; NI – Nigeria; SA – South Africa
Table 4: Top African Countries by Economic Freedom for 2011
Countries
Mauritius
Rwanda
Namibia
South Africa
Botswana
Cape Verde
Zambia
Burkina Faso
Madagascar
Ghana
Nigeria
Uganda

2011
82
76.9
72.9
72.3
70.5
64.8
62.2
61.5
60
59.4
56.7
50.3

Table 5: Overall Economic Freedom Index of Sub-Saharan African countries over
10 years
2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

58.1

57.8

58.6

56.5

57.9

61.3

61.8

64.6

63.5

63.7

66.15

Burkina
Faso

58

56.6

55.8

55.1

55.7

59.5

59.4

60.6

60.6

59.9

58.9

Rwanda

53.3

51.7

52.8

52.4

54.2

54.2

59.1

62.7

64.9

64.1

64.65

Uganda

64.1

62.9

63.9

63.1

63.8

63.5

62.2

61.7

61.9

61.1

59.91

Zambia

54.9

55

56.8

56.2

56.2

56.6

58

59.7

58.3

58.7

60.35

Botswana

69.9

69.3

68.8

68.1

68.2

69.7

70.3

68.8

69.6

70.6

72.04

Ghana

59.1

56.5

55.6

57.6

57

58.1

60.2

59.4

60.7

61.3

64.25

Mauritius

64.3

67.2

67.4

69.4

72.6

74.3

76.3

76.2

77

76.9

76.51

Namibia

62.4

61.4

60.7

63.5

61.4

62.4

62.2

62.7

61.9

60.3

59.42

Nigeria

49.2

48.4

48.7

55.6

55.1

55.1

56.8

56.7

56.3

55.1

54.34

South
Africa

66.3

62.9

63.7

63.5

63.4

63.8

62.8

62.7

62.7

61.8

62.48

Cape Verde
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Madagascar

60.9

63.1

61

61.1

62.4

62.2

63.2

61.2

62.4

62

61.74

61
Table 6: External Debt of Mauritius and Botswana from 2000-2012
Year
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Note: Amounts are in USD billions.

Mauritius
1.9
1.9
2.3
2.4
1.75
1.78
3.25
2.83
2.15
2.48
4.47
5.04
5.21

Botswana
0.65
0.46
0.33
0.36
0.39
0.53
0.52
0.52
0.41
0.42
1.68
2.22
1.97

Table 7: External Debt over 12 years for 12 Sub-Saharan countries.
2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

MS

1.9

1.9

2.3

2.4

1.75

1.78

3.25

2.83

2.15

2.48

4.47

5.04

5.21

BW

0.65

0.46

0.33

0.36

0.39

0.53

0.52

0.52

0.41

0.42

1.68

2.22

1.97

NI

29

32

32

29.7

31.07

30.55

32.45

6.28

8.01

8.32

10.11

11.02

10.43

GH

6

7

5.96

7.2

7.4

7.4

7

3.55

4.89

5.42

5.43

6.48

7.51

MAD

4.1

4.4

4.5

4.6

4.6

4.6

4.6

4.6

4.6

2.12

2.26

2.97

2.32

SA

25.7

25.6

25.5

24.7

25.9

27.01

29.97

55.47

39.78

71.81

73.84

80.52

46.07

CV

0.22

0.26

0.3

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.66

ZA

6.7

6.5

5.8

5.8

5.28

5.35

4.64

4.4

2.6

2.86

3.09

3.5

3.96

BF

1.3

1.3

1.5

1.3

1.3

1.3

1.85

1.85

1.33

1.67

1.78

2

2.34

RW

1.2

1.3

1.3

1.3

1.3

1.3

1.4

1.4

1.4

1.4

0.77

0.98

0.75

UG

3.1

3.6

3.4

2.8

3.82

3.87

4.97

1.46

1.5

1.72

2.55

2.89

3.53

NM

0.16

0.22

0.22

0.52

1.04

1.14

0.71

0.89

1

0.8

2.18

2.37

4.54

Note: Amounts are in USD billions.
Key: MS – Mauritius; BW – Botswana; MAD – Madagascar; CV – Cape Verde; BF –
Burkina Faso; ZA –Zambia; GH – Ghana; NI – Nigeria; SA – South Africa; RWRwanda; UG –Uganda; NM – Namibia
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